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SECTION I 
INTRODUCTION 
I 
1.1 PURPOSE 
This Fl ight Safety Plan presents flight safety requirements I restrictions I and instrumen- 
tation necessary for each launch. The plan aefines flight safety responsibilities of the 
Air Force Eastern Test Range (AFETR) and Kennedy Space Center (KSC). The require- 
ments for flight termination and popellant dispersion are described / and the restrictions 
and instrumentation applicable for each Apollo/Saturn V flight are listed. 
1.2 AUTHORITY 
The Fl ight Safety Plan is authorized within KSC by the Apollo Test Requirements 
Document I M-D MA 1400 I dated May 20 I 1964. 
1.3 SCOPE 
This plan is applicable during the launch countdown and powered flight of the vehicle 
up t o  orbit insertion. 
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SECTION I1 
FLIGHT SAFETY RES PONS IBI LIT1 ES 
2.1 AIR FORCE EASTERN TEST RANGE 
Agreement NMI 1052.3 1, dated January 17  , 1963,and supplemented by Agreement 
KMI 1052.1, dated March 9 ,  1965, places the responsibility for flight safety of all 
launches from the AFETR and KSC on the Commander of the AFETR.  This responsi- 
bi l i ty includes specifying flight termination system requirements , protecting l i fe  and 
property from an errant vehicle (except within KSC) establishing data requirements and 
flight safety instrumentation requirements , etc . 
2 . 2  KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 
By the same agreements cited in paragraph 2 .1  , the Director of KSC is  responsible for 
the protection of l i fe  and property within KSC from an errant vehicle launched or in- 
tended to be launched from Cape Kennedy or KSC. This responsibility includes desig- 
nating launch danger areas within KSC, clearing these areas during danger periods etc. 
Also included is the responsibility for Crew Safety on manned launches from KSC. This 
responsibility does not include Range Safety Fl ight Termination control of the vehicle 
after l i ftoff, which is  the so le  responsibility of the Commander of  the AFETR. To  that 
extent , the protection of l i f e  and property within KSC i s  a joint effort of KSC and 
AFETR. 
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SECTION 1 1 1  
FLIGHT SAFETY REQUl REMENT S 
3.1 FLIGHT TERMINATION SYSTEMS 
Al l  ball istic or space booster whic les launched at the AFETR must contain two indepen- 
dent flight termination syskms which are compatible with the AFETR ground system 
The two systems must be installed on the last power stage and must be capable of 
destroying a l l  powered stages of the vehicles. For stages that go into orbit prior to 
ignition , a command system is  not required. However I the stage must be capable of 
being destroyed by command from the preceding stage and also must contzh an auto- 
matic flight termination system. All stages that do cot contain a command system must 
contain an automatic flight termination system. The automatic flight termination sys- 
tem destroys the thrust capability of the stage in the event of premature separation or 
breakoff from the other stages carrying a flight termination system The termination 
system is autonatical ly activated by mechanical means when premature separation or 
breakoff occurs . The manned portion of a space vehicle wi l l  not require a destruct sys- 
tem on manned flights Propulsive systems that are not considered as a stage of a 
vehicle (retrorockets , escape rockets I payloads, etc .I and which present radiclogical , 
toxicological I or explosive hazards wi!I require an automatic flight termination system 
i f  they have the capability of violating the launch area or flight safety lines. For 
liquid-propelled vehicles I flight termination action must cause engine shutdown and 
fuel dispersion or intermixing I depending upon the nature of the propellants 
The Apollo/Saturn V carries two independent flight termination and propellant disper- 
sion systems in  each active booster stage. There is  no destruct system associated 
with the Apollo spacecraft. Figures 3-1 through 3-3 pictorially display the Apollo/ 
Saturn V flight termination/propellant dispersion system . 
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Figure 3-1. S-IC Propellant Dispersion System 
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SECTION I V  
FUGHT SAFETY RESTRICTIONS 
4.1 PRECEDENCE 
The infomation contained in this section is disseminated several months before launch 
and is subject to change at any time. In event of conflict between the Flight Safety 
Plan and the Apollo Mission Rules published for each launch, the Mission Rules shall 
be considered the official source for procedures or requirements . (The Mission Rules 
are constantly subject to revision/updating .I 
4.2 WEATHER RESTRICTIONS 
4.2.1 CEILING. A minimum ceiling height is imposed on all launches. The height 
of the ceiling is  &ermined by the time required for the launch a m  radars to acquire 
the vehicle a b  liftoff. The minimum ceiling for AS-504 w i l l  be 2,000 feet. 
4.2.2 VISIBIUTV. The vehicle must be visible from the following radar: 
MILA 19.18. 
4 .2 .3 WINDS. A wind restriction is usually imposed on the launch i f  the vehicle 
remains over Cape Kennedy for any length of time. This restriction prevents pieces of 
a destructed vehicle from drifting into prdected areas. The wind restriction for AS-504 
is a 1.25 sigma annual wind profile (figure 1-11 applicable to an altitude of 30 kilo- 
meters. The critical wind directions are 35 degrees and 105 degrees . In the event 
this profile is violated by ptemiling wind conditions during countdown, the Range Safety 
Division perfms a computer-simulated flight, terminating thrust and breaking the vehi- 
cle into pieces at each interval I with the prevailing winds acting on them to &ermine 
i f  the pieces can fall outside the impact l imit lines. 
4.3 IMPACT LIMIT LINES 
4.3.1 CAPE KENNEDY RANGE SAFETY OFFICER ACTION. The impact l imi t  lines 
to be used for the AS-504 launch are shown in figure 4-2 . The Cape Kennedy Range 
Safety Officer (CURSO) w i l l  take Range Safety action , h e n  necessary 8 to prevent the 
vehicle, or pieces thereof # from impacting outside of these boundaries. 
4.4 OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS 
4.4.1 LAUNCH VEHICLE . A restriction has been placed on the booster concerning 
engine cutoff resulting from an abort action. An airborne timer wil l  be flown in the 
booster that w i l l  prevent, for a stipulated period of time, booster engine cutoff except 
by Range Safety command For AS-50g the timer w i l l  be set to allow booster engine 
cutoff by an abort command from T+30 seconds on. 
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Figure 4-2 Impact limit lines br AS-5W 
4.4.1.1 Command Receivers. Two operational Range Safety command receivers on 
each stage b-lC, S -11, and S-IVB) are mandatory for launch. 
4.4.1.2 C-Band Beacons. One of two C-Band Beacons is "MANDATORY" for 
launch, the other "K(F)1LY d ESIRABLE." 
4.4.2 SPACECRAFT RESTRICT1 ONS . None. 
4.4.3 CREW SAFETY. None. 
4.4.4 OTHER CONSIDERATIONS. Other agreements and/or restrictions that have a 
bearing on the overall flight safety area are given in the following paragrapns: 
a. To allow a successful a h t  of the command module during the S-IC flight, a 
time delay w i l l  be imposed betweah the commands "ARM" and "DESTRUCT .'I This 
interval is governed by a timer on the Range Safety Officer's @SO) console. For 
AS-504 the timer wil l  be set for 4 .O seconds. 
b. The RSO wi l l  accomplish the pad emergency range cutoff procedure i f  ignition 
occurs but the space vehicle w i l l  nd liftoff and NASA is unable to accomplish liftoff. 
The RSO wil l  send "ARM/MFCO" only in response to a coded verbal request from the 
NASA Launch Vehicle Test Conductor (CLTC). The CLTC w i l l  call the RSO on the 
greenphone CLTC-RSO link to transmit this request. The RSO w i l l  not execute this 
procedure i f  he has a liftoff indication. 
c. The Flight Director (FD) wi l l  initiate abort request in response to  a coded 
verbal request ftom the RSO. This procedure wil l be executed if Range Safety flight 
termination criteria has been violated and RSO efforts to terminate thrust have failed. 
The request from RSO to FD w i l l  be transmitted on the Flight Director loop, with the 
FIDO-RSO pritate line as backup. 
d. The RSO wi l l  send "ARM/MFCO" in r e s p o w  to a coded verbal request from 
the FD or the Flight Dynamics Officer (FIDO). This procedure wil l  be executed i f  
abort limits have been exceeded and abort action has been unsuccessful. The request 
from FD/FIDO to the RSO w i l l  be transmitted on the Apollo RSO loop, with the FID0- 
RSO private line as backup. 
e. If Range Safety destruct lines are violated, the RSO w i l l  send 'IARM/MFCOJ1 
and notify the FD/FIDO. No SPS thrusting maneuver w i l l  be initiated following such 
Range Safety action. 
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f. If the "ARM/MFCO" command is required and transmitted, and an established 
impact point (IPI i s  on the Cape Kennedy land area, "DESTRUCT/PD" will be sent. 
"DESTRUCT/PD" wil l  be used to terminate thrust i f  an IP cannot be established. 
to JIARM/MFCOIJ or crew initiated abort . The "DESTRUCT/PD" function wi l l  be sent 
as necessary only for dispersion purposes I and only after FD/FIDO confirmation of 
satisfactory spacecraft separation. 
- -  
9 .  When the IP has moved off the Cape, flight termination action w i l l  be limited 
h. I f  a satisfactory IP  is established and "DESTRUCT/PD" is deemed unneces- 
sary , the RSO w i l l  ndify FD/FIDO and send "SAFE" upon FD/FIDO's request. 
i. FD/FIDO w i l l  declare to the RSO when there is no possibility of inserting the 
spacecraft into an orbit, and the RSO w i l l  not allow the African gate to be overflown. 
j .  An ETR Range Safety Officer (BRSO) is required at Bermuda to monitor pre- 
sent position and impact prediction charts I and to transmit the Range Safety functions 
when commanded to do so by the RSO. The BRSO wi l l  assume Range Safety responsi- 
bility in the event of loss of communications between the BRSO and the RSO during the 
period of Bennuda primary command coverage. 
k. Safing by the RSO w i l l  be done only if the RSO has verification of S-IVB C/O 
or the FD/FIDO requests "SAFE". When safing i s  confirmed, the RSO w i l l  state to 
the FD/FIDO "SAFING CONFIRMED". 
I . If safing cannot be confirmed by the RSO , another safing attempt will be made 
by the RSO on the first &ita1 pass over the Cape. Coordination w i l l  be effected with 
the Superintendent of Range Operations (SRO) and FIDO to ensure command coverage, 
noninterference with other command functions, and telemetry display availability. At 
the agreed time, FlDO wi l l  state "COMMAND CLEAR, RSO SEND SAFE." Upon 
confirmation, the RSO will state, SAFING CONFIRMED .I' 
SECTION V 
FLIGHT SAFETY INSTRUM ENTATION 
5.1 SAFETY DATA SOURCES 
The AFETR requires that at least two different and adequate sources of safety data for 
each phase of powered flight be opetational at launch. An "adequate" source is defined 
as one which can protect the applicable impact l im i t  line without endangering a normal 
vehicle. The RSO w i l l  ensure that the adequate data sour- requirement is  met and 
that those requirements designated "critical" are provided before giving a launch clear- 
ance. Those items designated "critical" for AS-504 and therefore mandatory for 
launch are: 
a. Impact Predicto;. 
b. Bermuda Command Control Transmitter. 
C. 8enn~da FPS-16, Bermuda FPQ-6, 
Grand Turk FPQ-18 (2 of 3). 
d. IU C-Band Beacons, (1 of 2) 
Instrumentation available during S-IC stage powered flight is: 
a. 
b. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
9. 
h. 
c. 
High Resolution Trackers (HRT) 1 & 2. 
KSC TPQ-18 C-Band Radar (19.18). 
Pabic k A FB FPQ-6 C-Band Radar. (0.18 1. 
Clotract Station I . 
Program and Flightline Electronic Sky Screen Equipment (ELSSE). 
Cape FPS-16 C-Band Radar (1.16). 
Offset Doppler (ODOP). 
GBI TPQ-18 C-Band Radar (3.18). 
Instrumentation available during S-ll stage powered flight is: 
a. 
e. 
b. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
9. 
h. 
i. 
i. 
Cape FPS-16 C-Band Radar (1.16). 
MlLA TPQ-18 C-Band Radar (19.18). 
Patrick AFB FPQ-6 C-Band Radar (0.18). 
GBI TPQ-18 C-Band Radar (3.18). 
Grand Turk TPQ-18 C-Band Radar (7.18). 
Bermuda FPS-16 C-Band Radar. 
Bermuda FPQ-6 C-Band Radar. 
FI ightl ine ELSSE . 
Glotrack Station I, 
Antigua FPQ-6 C-Band Radar (91.181, 
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Instrumentation available during S-IVB stage powered flight is: 
a. Grand Turk TPQ-18 C-Band Radar (7.18). 
b. Bermuda FPS-16 C-Band Radar. 
c. Bermuda FPQ-6 C-Band Radar. 
d. Antigua FPQ-6 C-Band Radar (91.18). 
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